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The present work explores the separation barriers built by the Israeli government 
and military as products and producers of asymmetries of power between Israelis 
and Palestinians; and, at the same time, as products and producers of 
discourses characterized by the naturalization of evil. In such discourses, 
embedded in both Israeli and Palestinian politics, evil is singularized as a unique 
cultural property of the adversary. Violence and aggression on the part of the 
national adversary are then perceived as a sign of a primitive morality, detached 
from political and historical circumstances; and the violence of each party is 
justified as a defensive war on the “evil” other. A return to Melanie Klein enables 
one to trace these dynamics, and to approach the complexities of the play of 
representations, projections and identification that affect, and are affected by, 
Israeli and Palestinian management of the conflict. The last section of this paper 
offers a critical reading of Jacqueline Rose’s analysis of the Zionist psyche, a 
reading that is at the same time an affirmation of Rose’s extrapolation of Kleinian 
thought into the political arena. This section raises fundamental questions about 
the perspective of the cultural analyst, and calls for incorporation of some 
essentials of a psychoanalytic stance into the practice of cultural critique.  
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On the Israeli Side of the Wall: Politicization of Might 
 
The “seam zone” is an Israeli-demarcated strip of land, extending over several 
hundred square kilometers east of the green line, bounded by a wall and a fence 
which separate it physically and legally from the West Bank (Arieli 326). Former 
IDF Colonel Shaul Arieli, who has studied the fence issue extensively on behalf 
of the Council for Peace and Security, notes that the idea that the wall will 
demarcate the borders between Israel and Palestine began to prevail in the 
Israeli political arena after the second Intifada erupted in late 2000 (327). Several 
politicians gave voice to the notion that the wall should demarcate the limits of 
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the eastern territories under the sovereign rule of the State of Israel, which are 
currently undefined by borders.  
Tsipi Livni, while serving as minister of justice, said that the separation 
fence would constitute “the future border of the State of Israel,” and that “the High 
Court of Justice, in its rulings over the fence, is drawing the country’s borders.”1 
Ehud Barak, too, when serving as minister of defense in the government of Ehud 
Olmert, noted that “when we build a fence it is clear that there are areas that are 
beyond the fence, and it is clear that in the permanent accord… these areas that 
are beyond the fence will not be part of the State of Israel”2. Prime Minister 
Sharon also supported the idea that the wall will eventually become the Israeli 
state’s border, and Ehud Olmert agreed: “The direction is clear, we are moving 
toward separation from the Palestinians, towards the demarcation of a 
permanent border of Israel”.3 
The notion that the fence should implement a political policy of separation 
would have implied that its path would follow the “Green Line,” i.e., the unofficial 
border demarcated as an Armistice demarcation line after the 1967 war. This 
was not the case.  
Objections to the conception of the wall as a mark of political separation 
were expressed by those who opposed the construction of the barrier due to the 
belief that such barrier would set the boundary for a “terrorist state” that would 
arise on the other side (328). Among the objectors were the Chief of Staff Shaul 
Mofaz and his deputy Moshe Ya’alon. The latter opposed the wall as a sign of 
defeatism and military passivism (328).  
The second Intifada and the economic reality eventually led Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon to rule for the construction of the fence (328). Sharon handed the 
task to the IDF and the defense establishment, who did not want it (328). The 
path of the wall and fence has thus been subject to profound disputes among 
their architects. The political echelon decided on a route of the fence ranging 
deeply into the territory of the West Bank (beyond the Green Line) (330). 
However, there were High Court petitions submitted against it (329). Whereas 
Sharon supported pushing the fence eastward, the chief of staff at the time, Gabi 
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Ashkenazi, sought to move the fence westward (332). Since the IDF was handed 
the task of the construction of the barrier, it was unable to remain disengaged in 
matters concerning its path, and the unavoidable resulted – the politicization of 
the military system (332). 
The politicization of the military has far-reaching implications for the 
political as well as for the military establishment. Arieli observes that whereas the 
IDF’s declared principle is to decrease the “offensive component” and the “friction 
with Palestinians” – in effect, the IDF actually intensified its intervention with 
Palestinian life, “despite the fact that the fence provided a reasonable solution for 
preventing the uncontrolled entry of Palestinians and vehicles into Israel” (332).  
The rest is recent history - hundreds of roadblocks, preventing movement 
between Palestinian communities in the West Bank, continuous friction with the 
IDF soldiers at the checkpoints, and a traffic regime that significantly changes 
Palestinian everyday life – all these are an inherent part of the IDF control of 
Palestinian movement in the West Bank.  
Furthermore, writes Arieli, the logic of the fence built by the IDF counters 
the logic of security, according to which Palestinian lands should have been 
separated from the seam zone wherever possible. Instead, lands were separated 
from their owners (339). Arieli told a Ha’aretz interviewer: "The desire to include 
more territory within the confines of the fence than is practically possible has 
resulted in a situation where the settlement blocs are left outside of the fence 
while other blocs remain vulnerable and do not receive protection. In addition, 
exorbitant sums of money have been pumped into infrastructure and fences that 
were supposed to follow a route that was impossible to complete."4 
 
Naturalization of Threat: The Continuation of War by Other Means 
 
The wall, then, is a symptomatic substitute for a missing border, which is a failure 
of political self-determination. The inability to stabilize a policy regarding the 
border, and the de-facto management of the “seam zone” by the IDF and the 
security establishment can be said to turn the “seam zone” into a zone of 
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struggle, not only between terrorists and innocent civilians, but also between 
different ideas of an Israeli sovereignty.  
Multi-faceted and conflicting notions of what an Israeli state is, and 
struggles around the idea of the State that should guide the demarcation of its 
borders play a vital role in the indecisiveness regarding the wall’s path and role. 
“Self-determination” means different things for different political and social 
players, and there is a related difference in the notions of “border” implied in their 
various discourses (Mukamel, 2009). In the discourse of the extreme political 
right-wing, the relation to the Holy Land is determined in the bible – the Land of 
Israel is promised to the Chosen People. The borders of the state are thus 
divinely pre-determined and unchangeable, marking the restoration of an ancient 
Jewish rule over Great Israel, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. 
For the political center, self-determination means the right of Jews for sovereign 
rule, and thus the borders are markers of the territory in which such rule is 
legitimate. Since borders are not sacred, they can compromise the notion of 
Great Israel and be politically negotiated and determined. For the extreme 
political left-wing, self-determination is detached from race, religion and ethnicity, 
and thus the borders should serve as demarcation of a democratic, non-ethnic 
rule, in which Israelis and Palestinians have equal citizenship (bi-national state), 
or, more generally, a rule in which all citizens, regardless of nationality, religion 
etc., have equal rights (a state for all its citizens).  
The way the wall and fence are designed, their path and their continuous 
military management, are justified as “security needs.” This phrasing forecloses 
not only public discourse on the acts of state in the West Bank and Gaza, but 
also a political debate on the politicization of the military and on the borders of 
the State of Israel. The notion of political separation thus gave way to military 
discourse not only for security reasons. It is not only because of security threats 
that separation failed.  The political notion of separation between Israel and 
Palestine does not translate itself into separation de-facto, partly because various 
forms of Israeli national identity resist it. This resistance to the political notion of 
separation leans on a naturalization of Palestinian terror as evil, and on its 
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correlate – an experience of Israel’s moral superiority that justifies its military 
actions.  
Mainstream politicians of the center and political right express a 
fundamental belief in the moral superiority of the Israeli-Jewish society vis-à-vis 
terror as a natural evil, i.e., as detached from political and historical context. 
Several central players in Israeli politics have expressed these views on different 
occasions.  
In an interview for Ha’aretz, Livni said she is convinced that IDF soldiers 
will never intentionally hurt women and children and that this creates a 
fundamental moral difference between “us”, Israeli Jews, and “them,” 
Palestinians. Her words express a conviction that Israelis’ morals are superior to 
those of Palestinians, and that the actions of the IDF are fundamentally justified 
and morally impeccable.5 A similar conviction is expressed in Ehud Olmert's 
statement in the memorial service for Israeli victims of terror, 2005:  
In this time of communion with our citizens who have died in hostile 
attacks, I cannot refrain from imagining the horrific sights of terrorist 
bombings in Jerusalem, to which I bore witness. I cannot refrain 
from thinking how deep is the moral abyss between our values and 
the values of our enemies. We do not negate the right of any nation 
or any state to live in peace. We are fighting only to defend 
ourselves and thwart aggression against us. We are making every 
effort to target [our attacks] and reduce the injury of innocent 
people.6 
In a more recent memorial to victims of terror,7 Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu said:  
The atrocities of the terrorists against our people know neither 
moral nor political limits.8 Their cruelty and hatred are insatiable. 
There is one thing common to all these murderers: they wish to 
erase the Jewish people from the face of the earth and to uproot 
our people from our land, the Land of Israel. They will not succeed. 
We are here in Jerusalem and we will remain in Jerusalem, our 
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united capital and the Holy City of the Jewish People throughout 
history.9 
The belief in the moral superiority of Israel is related to a belief in the 
absolute morality of the IDF. Halperin et al. note that “Even in present times, 
political and military leaders alike refer to the IDF as the most moral military force 
in the world.” They cite the statement of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at 
the opening of a cabinet meeting after seven members of a Palestinian family 
had been killed: “the IDF is the most moral military force in the world… it has 
never implemented a policy of hurting civilians and does not do so presently 
either” (66). 
The army, too, introduces itself with a humanitarian self-image. The official 
website of the IDF reads:  
The design, construction and operation of the Security Fence aim 
to balance the imperative to protect innocent lives from terror with 
the humanitarian needs of the local Palestinian population. Israel's 
government realizes that the construction of the Security Fence can 
introduce hardship into the lives of innocent Palestinians and 
regrets those hardships. All attempts to minimize such problem 
have been and will continue to be made.10 
A message of equality and symmetry is conveyed, a concern for innocent lives of 
both Israelis and Palestinians, while the fence is introduced as a necessary 
minimal defense against life-endangering terror. The main objective of the fence, 
the statement reads, is a protection of Israeli citizens from terror. The fence “can 
introduce hardship” into the lives of innocent Palestinian citizens – as though it 
does not introduce, de facto, the conditions which endanger Palestinian 
individual and civil life. It is as if the problem of military rule over civilians is one of 
lack of human kindness vis-à-vis “humanitarian needs.” The irony of this 
humanitarian image can be seen in various checkpoints along the separation 
fence and wall, where concern for the needy is expressed by assigning separate 
lanes and desks. [Photograph – “humanitarian lane”] 
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The path of the wall and its management are thus founded not only on the 
imperative to defend Israeli society, but also on the perception that the terror 
Israel faces is a singular and natural evil; that Palestinian hate and violence 
towards Israelis is an effect of their terrorist nature. Thus, Israel’s violence 
against the Palestinians is justified as self-defense, i.e., morally impeccable.  
 
On the Palestinian side of the Wall: Militarization of Right 
 
This dynamics nourishes an asymmetrical struggle in which Israel launches daily 
attacks against the Palestinian population on the eastern side of the wall, “and 
Hamas strikes at Israeli civilian population concentrations in the Gaza region with 
rockets and mortars – for which Israel still lacks an effective defensive or 
offensive response” (Arieli 193). It also nourishes another dynamic, in which 
Israelis are perceived as inherently evil, immoral and principally unwilling to 
reach an agreement. 
Ramadan Shallah, Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad expresses, in a 
rare interview, a profound disbelief in Israel’s intention to resolve the conflict. 
“The Palestinian struggle started with the idea of a one-state solution, then made 
every concession for a two-state solution. And nothing,” he said (Atran and 
Axelrod 3). “You will not find any political faction in the future that will accept a 
two-state solution based on Israeli security needs. We see that a sovereign and 
independent Palestinian state is impossible under such conditions” (4). Since the 
Israeli idea of a two-state solution does not allow for Palestinian sovereignty, and 
since a one-state solution is not foreseeable, the solution is armed resistance: “I 
see no end to the struggle until Israel is defeated” (4). 
On the one hand, Israel is perceived as the only obstacle for a political 
settlement. On the other hand, there is complete disavowal of politics as such as 
a means for resolution. Shallah says: “We aren’t the guilty party to be asked for a 
solution because we didn’t create the problem.” Negating the possibility of a 
political discourse and arrangement, in favor of sacred morals, Shallah states 
that  
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Our sacred duty is to fight, to resist occupation of our sacred land 
and change the conditions of our people. That is our duty, our 
sacred duty. Others, like Fatah, have maps and negotiations. We 
resist. (Atran and Axelrod 7) 
The political option is negated both out of disappointment and rage, and out of a 
denial of a possibility of negotiation, which would mean political recognition of 
Israeli sovereignty.  
A more ambivalent stance can be found in the words of Abu Marzouk, 
Deputy Director of Hamas’s political bureau. In a recent and rare interview for 
The Forward, Abu Marzouk described the notion of hudna, or truce, with Israel.11 
Hudna will establish a relationship between the two nations, which is “better than 
war and better than the continuous resistance against the occupation. And better 
than Israel occupying the West Bank and Gaza, making all these difficulties and 
problems on both sides.” On the one hand, there is a willingness to negotiate and 
thus to politically engage with the State of Israel. On the other hand, such 
engagement would not mean recognition of Israeli sovereignty. Hudna is thus an 
agreement on a temporary suspension of violence, not on political recognition. 
When confronted with the “concerns that Hamas’s goal during a hudna would 
remain the destruction of Israel as a state and that a truce would give Hamas 
time to build up its arms toward that end,” Abu Marzouk said: “It’s very difficult to 
say after 10 years what will be on both sides. Maybe my answer right now [about 
recognizing Israel] is completely different to my answer after 10 years.” Abu 
Marzouk and Shallah’s  views differ at this point. Whereas the concept of hudna 
constitutes the terms on which political negotiations are possible, Shallah rejects 
negotiation as such. When asked about hudna, Shallah replied: “I don’t agree 
with Hamas’s idea of a long hudna with Israel, because Israel will only use the 
time to make things worse.” Agreement can be made “on a short-term truce for 
specific purposes, like getting food in to the people” (Atran and Axelrod 7). 
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Naturalization of Threat: Resistance by Other Means 
 
The refusal of political discourse is not only a derivative of the oppression of 
Palestinians by Israeli occupation, and of the negation of Palestinian civil rights. 
Like the words of Livni, Olmert, Netanyahu and others, those of Shallah and Abu 
Marzouk reveal additional reasons for the failure to translate resistance into 
political discourse. 
Abu Marzouk, in the interview cited above, was asked about the first 
section in the Hamas Charter that cites a hadith, or saying, of the Prophet 
Mohammad. The charter reads:   
The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight the 
Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and 
trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is 
a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree would 
not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews.12 
In his reply, Abu Marzouk “defended the hadith as being taken out of context. 
The passage, he said, did not apply to all Jews — just those in Palestine.” 
The second section of the Charter cites passages from the “Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion.” Marzouk commented: “The Zionists wrote it, and they said, 
‘No, we didn’t.’ [It’s] linked to Zionists.” When informed that the protocols were a 
forgery, Marzouk appeared nonplussed and said that it was the first time that he 
had heard this.13 Just as terror is perceived as a natural evil by some Israeli 
leaders, so is the project of Jewish self-determination perceived as naturally evil 
by some Palestinian leaders. Since the essence of Israeli sovereignty is 
understood as the negation of Palestinian political existence and national identity, 
the natural conclusion is that Israelis should be fought and exterminated.  
In Palestinians’ image of Israeli evil, the separation wall and fence mean 
an obstacle for resistance – since the targets of resistance are Israelis as such. 
In an interview to Al Jazeera dated 11.11.2006 Shallah says:  
The istishhad (martyrdom) operations – as a strategic choice or as 
a choice created by the Palestinian people in order to balance the 
power and deterrence in a battle with an enemy, a battle that is 
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unbalanced from the outset, they [the operations] exist and we will 
not renounce them. But, the timing of the operations and the ability 
to execute them – depend on the conditions on ground. In the West 
Bank, for example, there is the separation fence, which is an 
obstacle to resistance. And if it were not there – the situation would 
have been completely different.14 
The separation wall is resisted not as annexing and oppressive but as that which 
halts the struggle against Israeli rule as such, that is, an obstacle to the liberation  
“Bad” Objects and “Good Selves” in Phantasy: Melanie Klein Revisited 
 
The analysis of the naturalization of evil of Israelis/Palestinians and its relation to 
the militarization of conflict suggests that “terrorism” and “occupation” are not 
only violent acts of national (individual or state) agents, but are also signifiers that 
play a central role in the failure of political negotiation and agreement, qua 
political.  
Complicating the discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian relations with 
Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytic theory will involve a translation that significantly 
changes the meaning of theory.15 In the analysis of the naturalization of evil of 
Israelis and Palestinians presented below, Kleinian theory is extrapolated  into 
the political arena, whereby three of its main essentials are undermined: its 
reference to infants in their few first months of life (i.e., reference to pre-linguistic 
processes); its chronological account (i.e., an account of a progression in which 
“primitive” psychic states precede “normal” ones); and its universalism (i.e., its 
reference to biological instincts and needs). Such displacement allows for an 
investigation of the role of phantasy, of aggressive and libidinal ties in an analysis 
of the social and political realm, without their reduction, by analogy, to an infantile 
ego. 
Klein’s theory offers an elaborate phenomenology of a “primitive” mental 
state, termed the “schizoid-paranoid position.” It is characterized by an 
intolerable experience from which the self cannot relieve itself; and, as a 
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defense, experiences itself as split from its “bad” parts. These “bad” parts are 
located in an external object that is then feared as a “bad” object. The self 
attempts to expel the “bad” object in phantasy, but the “bad” self is transformed 
through this phantasy, so that the object is eventually experienced as the “bad” 
self. In her reading of Melanie Klein and of Klein's successors, Jacqueline Rose 
elaborates the distinction between phantasy as a mental expression of needs 
and instincts, and between phantasy as an interpretation, or subjective 
production. It is the latter notion, claims Rose, that accords with the "impossibility 
of assigning some simple origin to destruction", characteristic of Klein's dictum 
(141). "Bad" objects are thus not a derivative of an aggressive instinct, but are 
rather constituted as such in a play of projections and introjections giving rise to 
grandiose, omnipotent experiences of self and object, and to related persecution 
and annihilation anxieties. 
The phenomenology of the schizoid-paranoid position can be applied to 
an analysis of the role of the “evil objects” in the relations between Israelis and 
Palestinians. We have seen that moral superiority is experienced despite the 
destruction brought about by the violence on each side. In Kleinian terms, we can 
say that the “evil” object (“occupier,” “terrorist”) is a product of the transformation 
of aggression in each side’s phantasies (i.e., “a land without people”; “restoration 
of the past”), so that aggression is disowned, projected as the experience of the 
evil, persecuting Palestinian/Israeli other that is expelled and annihilated. In this 
process aggression is “lost” as a self-experience. Thus, each side perceives its 
violence as “good,” i.e., as an affirmation of one’s moral superiority, a sacred 
duty. The disavowal of aggression by Israelis and Palestinians is manifest in the 
fact that neither side recognizes itself in the other’s signifier, which refers to its 
inflicted violence (the signifier “terrorism” is denied by Palestinians, whereas the 
signifier “occupation” is denied by Israelis). In this way, “war on terror” and “war 
on Israel” are experienced as self-defense, whereas their related aggression and 
destructiveness are, experientially, not there.  
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Minding the Analyst 
  
What is the role of psychoanalytically-informed critical theory in the analysis of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli occupation? This question raises a 
more general one, i.e., how should we conceive of the relation between the 
psychoanalytically-informed critical theorist and his or her subjects of analysis? In 
importing psychoanalysis into the cultural, political domains, what happens to the 
role of the analyst? 
These questions will be approached by a return to Jacqueline Rose’s The 
Question of Zion. The text shares many similarities to the discourse of the 
extreme political left in Israel. Thus, its exploration is also an attempt to 
understand certain aspects of the political ineffectiveness of advancing a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to Israeli occupation.  
“The birth of a nation” claims Rose “might be cause for celebration; it 
might be cure. But written across the heart of the narrative, as something it 
cannot quite forget, is a counsel of despair” (Rose 1040-1041). At the heart of the 
Zionist narrative, resides a despair that is semi-conscious to the Zionist real and 
metaphoric agent: “Theodor Herzl was a depressive” (1042). Depression is not 
the only pathological mental state, it alternates with manic states that seem to 
defend against it – it was mania that Herzl experienced when writing Der 
Judenstaat. Herzl’s “sense of losing his mind,” looking as though he is “suffering 
a psychotic shock” or “suffering from a terrible disease” (1050-1052), becomes 
an allegory of the denial of depression that finds its way back into consciousness 
on rare occasions – or, more severely, becomes embodied. Illness is not 
embodied only in Herzl, that is, the disease is not a personal one: 
The depression of Zionism is not, however, confined to the creative 
mania of Herzl alone. In January 1902 Weizmann wrote to Leo 
Motzkin: “[My health] is not good. As a matter of fact I went to see 
the doctor yesterday. He diagnosed neurasthenia and weakness of 
the respiratory organs. Uebermüdung und Ueberreizung 
(overfatigue and overexcitement).” (1058-1059) 
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These physical symptoms and weakness are symptomatic – yet neither of 
“Jewish self-hatred,” nor of “a recycling of anti-Semitic stereotypes” (1062). 
Rather, they “testify to a form of recognition. Too much was being demanded 
(excitement, or overstimulation, wears the spirit thin). In order for this dream to 
be brought to fruition, too much—violently—would have to be performed” (1058). 
The dream – Herzl’s dream, which is also the Zionist dream – is thus a manic 
dream, essentially destructive for its dreamer and for its Palestinian “other.” Much 
of what follows is presented as proof. 
Yet, when a diagnosis is not taken literally, i.e., when its metaphoricity is 
lost in interpretation, there seems to be not much that can contradict it. In this 
way interpretation becomes alien to the texts that it reads – it is not only ironic, 
but tells a truth, whereas words of key players are sometimes brought up merely 
to be negated. “The captain weeps,” writes Weizmann to his fiancée in the same 
letter quoted above; “The man setting out to war weeps” (1058).  These words 
are interpreted as a fundamental moral ignorance, a hubris from which Zionism 
never recovered: “Zionism would ask too much. To achieve the dream of Zion, 
you would have to place yourself in a psychically unoccupiable place—high or 
low, exalted or in despair” (1068). It is this mental reason, which is also a moral 
reason, of which Zionism is ignorant that makes the realization of Zionism 
possible only in a dream state, a State in dreams: “Zionism could be forged only 
in a state ‘beyond consciousness’ (as in Altneuland, the making of the nation 
cannot be grasped by the conscious mind)” (1069). 
Zionism and its history are thus approached not only in an attempt to trace 
the different, conflicting and ambivalent ways by which the nation imagines itself, 
but rather as a dream, one dream. In this making of a dream, a Zionist dream, 
the stage is set for dismissing “Zionist” self-knowledge as an infantile 
(un)consciousness. “Precisely because Zionism had to make itself out of 
nothing—create a unity, a language, a homeland where there was none before—
it knows itself as a child of the psyche, a dream, a figment of the brain,” writes 
Rose (1088). It is as if a re-take on the myth something out of nothing is 
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performed here: “land without a people to a people without a land” is replaced by 
a myth of "consciousness without a subject to a subject without consciousness."  
When Zionism becomes a dream, it is (psycho)analyzed in isolation – no 
politics, no wars, no internal struggles, and much proof of its unconscious state. 
In Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein Rose raises a cardinal question on the 
place of the (psycho)analyst that is of the greatest relevance here, in the 
discussion of the place of the cultural analyst: “What problems must it pose for an 
analytic school to situate itself in the place of an infant to whom interpretation is 
by definition unwelcome and who is fantast and fool?” (147). One of the problems 
of such positioning as it emerges in The Question of Zion is the splitting between 
“good” Zionists and “bad” Zionists. The words of the former are not interpreted as 
part of a real, divergent, conflictual, ambivalent multiplicity of voices, but as an 
exception, a divergence, a clear, pure, moral moment when reason attempts to 
penetrate the collective dream, to no avail. When the truth is told about the reality 
of the Zionist unconscious, and at the same time about Zionism’s moral status as 
a child, “good” Zionist voices are idealized, kept apart from the rest, elevated as 
the voices of prophets at the gate. It is often as prophecies that the words of the 
extreme political left as well are voiced in Israeli public discourse.16 This is not 
merely a matter of literary style – what is missing in prophetic discourse is the 
possibility of relating to evil and violence from the stance of the psychoanalyst, 
i.e., a stance that is neither “external” nor “internal” to the subjects in analysis, 
but is reflectively critical of the loss of metaphoricity of the “walls” that constitute 
“outside” and “inside” as split. This absence of a (psycho)analytic stance is 
sometimes related to an inaccurate diagnosis that undermines the possibility of 
cure. In agreement with Edward Said, for example, Rose writes: “Seeing the 
enemy as outside threat only, Israel was sowing the seeds of long-term damage 
within” (2007, p. 1153). Said’s words in “Zionism from the Standpoint of Its 
Victims” convey a similar notion: “Everything that did stay to challenge Israel. . . 
was viewed not as something there, but as something outside Israel and Zionism 
bent on its destruction—from the outside” (1154-1155).  
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Does Israel see its enemies as “outside threat only”? In other words, is the 
signifier “Palestinian” foreclosed, in Lacanian terminology, in the Israeli 
unconscious? 17 It seems that a Kleinian description of the schizoid-paranoid 
position allows us to better account for the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian 
unconscious since it captures, as Rose so eloquently observes in Negativity in 
the Work of Melanie Klein, “the impossibility of assigning a simple origin to 
destruction” (141). The Israeli-Palestinian case is an example of such 
impossibility, where destruction is supported by phantasy in complex dynamics of 
projections and introjections. The impossibility of assigning a simple origin to 
destruction also means that an analysis of personal and/or cultural unconscious 
phantasies does not tell the whole truth about destruction and that the truth that it 
tells is part of the cultural arena in which phantasies, cultural and inter-cultural, 
are forged, and in which interpersonal, national, trans-national and inter-national 
destruction plays a  part. In psychoanalysis, no one is without phantasy, i.e., no 
one is outside the dream, and no one is always awake. A psychoanalytic  reading 
"otherwise", in Rose's terms, would thus aim " to demonstrate the triumph of the 
unconscious over all attempts at hermeneutic and therapeutic control" (128). As 
such, it would not lose sight of the problem stated by Rose, of how to transmit 
knowledge of the unconscious without effacing its force (131).  
Recognizing the difference between the psychotic state, in which 
foreclosure is a mark, and the schizoid-paranoid state, in which signification 
plays a prominent role, is important for understanding destruction and evil in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context. Seeing the “evil object” as a sign of a foreclosure 
means that for Palestinians, Israel as a signifier of national identity and state is 
symbolically non-existent, and that the same is true for Israelis vis-à-vis the 
signifier Palestine. It also means that there is only one “good” perspective for 
reading Israelis’ and Palestinians’ ideas, narratives and practices of self-
determination, i.e., the perspectives of their victims. But, as suggested above, the 
case is more complicated (if it were not, violence would have probably “resolved” 
the conflict long ago). It involves different and converging phantasies and their 
disavowals, projections and introjections that give rise to “good” and “bad” part-
Konturen IV (2013) 104 
objects and part-selves – a dynamic that, contrary to foreclosure, attests to the 
massive investment in signification (mis)interpretation and (mis)understanding.  
Freud’s theorization of the nature of group violence suggests that 
destruction does sometimes have simple origins. In a letter to Einstein, 
answering the latter’s query Why War? Freud writes of the prominent role of 
violence in the formation of society:  
It is a general principle, then, that conflicts of interest between men 
are settled by the use of violence. This is true of the whole animal 
kingdom, from which men have no business to exclude themselves. 
In the case of men, no doubt, conflicts of opinion occur as well 
which may reach the highest pitch of abstraction and which seem to 
demand some other technique for their settlement. That, however, 
is a later complication. (204)  
Violence (Freud here follows Hobbes), is the stuff from which human social ties 
are forged; violence over difference of opinions is only secondary: “Right is the 
Might of the Community.” Whether this is true or not, in societies haunted by 
annihilation anxiety, violence or threat of violence, this tends to feel like the case 
– as shown in the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian politicization of might and 
militarization of right. If Freud is right, then we do not have to assume the 
existence of an essential moral evil of the Israeli/Palestinian agents in the 
analysis of their “regress.” Rather, the wall can be seen as an attempt to defend 
against yet worse scenarios for all involved. We also do not have to resist the 
agents’ childlike senselessness – there is no childless adult in the Freudian world 
– in order to contemplate the future of its “illusion.” Such resistance, shows Klein, 
is only possible in phantasy. Freud’s dictum thus escapes moralism and 
utopianism: “It is my opinion,” Freud writes to Einstein, “that the main reason why 
we rebel against war is that we cannot help doing so. We are pacifists because 
we are obliged to be for organic reasons. And we then find no difficulty in 
producing arguments to justify our attitude” (214). Freud names the fundamental 
psychological condition by which “transition from violence to this new right or 
justice” can take place: “the union of the majority must be a stable and lasting 
Konturen IV (2013) 105 
one” (205). Maybe what is missing today in psycho/cultural analysis of the Israeli-
Palestinian situation are phantasies that will approach the powers of the 
majorities amidst destruction and deepening fragmentations, while drawing these 
powers towards a politics that would be worthy of its name. 
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Ha’aretz 12.01.05 in Arieli 329. 
2 Interview with Army Radio. December 4, 2007 in Arieli 330. 
3 In an interview on “Mishal Kham” program on Israel’s Channel Two 02.07.06 in 
Arieli 329.  
4 Amos Harel “West Bank not Done and Never Will be, It Seems.” Ha’aretz 
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5 Lily Galili “An alien from the establishment.” Ha’aretz 10.03.03. 
6 Aviram Zino "Ehud Ulmert: There is a Moral Abyss Between us and Our 
Enemeis." Ynet, 05.07,2005. 
7 The Hebrew word "chalal" often used when referring to victims of terror also 
denotes a person who has fallen in battle.  
8 The Hebrew word “gvul” means both a limit and border. It is used here by 
Netanyahu in the dual sense. 
9 Israel’s Channel Two News 04.25.12 
10  Minisitry of Defence website “Israel’s Security Fence”, “Humanitarian 
Concerns” http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CB90IA-
FobgJ:http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/pages/eng/Humanitarian.htm%2Baim
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8&startIndex=&startPage=1&rlz=1I7ADFA_enIL483&hl=iw&ct=clnk  
11 Larry Cohler-Esses “Hamas Wouldn’t Honor a Treaty, Top Leader Says.” The 
Forward 04.19.12. 
12  From Hamas charter, cited in Larry Cohler-Esses (see note 11) 
13 Larry Cohler-Esses (see note 11) 
14 http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/Heb/default.htm 
15 What Jacqueline Rose terms “reading otherwise”: “a strategy of reading which 
heads past the most immediate or professionally received meanings of the 
writer.” Referring to rereading Melanie Klein, Rose suggests that “Klein produced 
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a theory which, because of what it was trying to theorize, could not, by definition, 
contain or delimit itself.” (128) 
16 Yizhak Laor, for example, a poet and publicist, wrote on Netanyahu’s recent 
proposal to hold early elections: “There is no opposition, certainly not on the left, 
that will mark May 8 as the Festival of Fools of which the slogan is “We are all 
idiots,” with a cartoon of Kadima MK Shaul Mofaz on the lapel.” Yizhak Laor. 
“May 8, Festival of Fools.” in Ha’aretz  09.05.2012. 
17 Bernard-Henri Levy presents an account of the relation between Zionism and 
its “other” in a debate with Slavoj Zizek, held in New York Public Library, 
09.16.08. Levy’s portrayal of such relations is opposite of that of Said. Whereas 
for Said, everything that challenges Israel is perceived as an enemy attacking 
from the outside, for Levy challenges to Israel are admirably faced by 
incorporating opposition into politics: “Israel is the only country in the world where 
you have, in the political debate and in the parliament, members who are anti-
Zionism. You have some political parties of the extreme left, you have Arab party, 
who believe the creation of Zionism is a mistake, that the creation of Israel is a 
mistake. And not only are they tolerated, they are members of the debate.” See 
“Violence & The Left in Dark Times: A Debate.”  
http://fora.tv/2008/09/16/Violence__the_Left_in_Dark_Times_A_Debate It is 
interesting to think of Israel as the “good” and “bad” object as it emerges in these 
discourses – what they incorporate “about” Israel, and what they leave out. 
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